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[T]here can be no economic community or successful regional trade 
outside the people. [These individual and non-State persons] are the 
vessels through which trade is pursued and integration enhanced. 
An integration process which is pursued by politicians without the 
[people’s] active involvement . . . suffers from inertia. It becomes 
an institutional edifice with no meaningful impact on the lives of 
the people . . . .1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A significant aspect that figures prominently in Africa’s recent 
history is the emergence of sub-regional economic communities.2 
These communities came about with the realization that individual 
States stood very little chance at effectively competing in the 
liberalized structure of the mainstream world trading system.3 The 
earliest efforts that were made towards sub-regional economic 
integration in post-independence Africa are traceable to the 1960s;4 
many of these efforts focused primarily on geo-political and 
economic integration.5 Similar trends were also evinced in other 
continents of the world, for instance, the establishment of the 
 
1 Richard Frimpong Oppong, Integration Through Law: An Examination of the 
Jurisprudence of Regional Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa, in 7 
MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK, 203, 209–10 
(Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2007). 
2 See FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 488 (2007). 
3 Rene N’Guettia Kouassi, The Itinerary of the African Integration Process: An 
Overview of the Historical Landmarks, 1 AFR. INTEGRATION REV., no. 2, 2007 at 1, 1 (“It 
was the political and economic reactions to these adverse effects [Africa’s balkanization] 
that triggered the establishment of a large number of intergovernmental agencies operating 
in the field of integration, to enable African countries to speak with one voice and to ease 
the constraints linked to the limited size of national markets.”); Thoko Kaime, SADC and 
Human Security: Fitting Human Rights into the Trade Matrix, 13 AFR. SEC. REV. no. 1, 
2004 at 109, 109; William N. Mwanza, Africa’s Continental Integration Agenda: 
Suggestions for African Countries and Regions, in SUPPORTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA—REVIEW OF SELECT ISSUES 50, 50 (Alta Schoeman ed., 
2010); Dirk Hansohm & Rehabeam Shilimela, Progress in Economic Integration Within 
SADC, in 6 MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 6, 7 
(Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2006). 
4 Oliver C. Ruppel, Regional Economic Communities and Human Rights in East and 
Southern Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THEIR 
PROTECTION AND PROMOTION 275, 275 (Anton Bösl & Joseph Diescho eds., 2009); 
Kouassi, supra note 3, at 1. 
5 Colin McCarthy, Is African Economic Integration in Need of a Paradigm Change? 
Thinking Out of the Box on African Integration, in 7 MONITORING REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA YEARBOOK 6, 6 (Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2007). 
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European Union,6 the North Atlantic Free Trade Area, the Association 
of South East Asian Nations, and the Caribbean Community.7 The 
early moves towards economic integration in Africa resulted in the 
proliferation of a number of sub-regional economic communities with 
each being established under individual constitutive treaties. In July 
2006, the African Union Assembly officially recognized the 
following8: the African Maghreb Union (AMU),9 the Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD),10 the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA),11 the East African Community 
(EAC),12 the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS),13 the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS),14 the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD),15 and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).16 Although not explicitly recognized in the African Union 
 
6 Kurt Riechenberg, The Merger of Trading Blocks and the Creation of the European 
Economic Area: Legal and Judicial Issues, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 63 (1995). 
7 See Henry Onoria, Locus Standi of Individuals and Non-State Entities Before 
Regional Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa, 18 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
143, 144 (2010). 
8 Ruppel, supra note 4, at 276. 
9 Treaty Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union, Feb. 17, 1989, 1546 U.N.T.S. 160 
[hereinafter AMU Treaty] (establishing the African Maghreb Union). 
10 Treaty on the Establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Feb. 4, 1998 
(establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States). 
11 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, opened for 
ratification Nov. 5, 1993, 2314 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into force Dec. 8, 1994) [hereinafter 
COMESA Treaty] (establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and 
replacing the Preferential Trade Area of 1981 [hereinafter PTA]). 
12 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 
U.N.T.S. 255, (entered into force July 7, 2000) (amended Dec. 14, 2006 and Aug. 20, 
2007) [hereinafter EAC Treaty] (establishing the East African Community). 
13 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, Oct. 18, 
1983 (entered into force Dec. 18, 1984) [hereinafter the ECCAS Treaty] (establishing the 
Economic Community of Central African States). 
14 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 
35 I.L.M. 660 (revised June 3, 1993) [hereinafter ECOWAS Treaty] (establishing the 
Economic Community of West African States). 
15 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Mar. 21, 
1996 [hereinafter IGAD] (establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development). 
16 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty] (establishing the Southern African Development 
Community). 
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(AU) Assembly decision, there is also the Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community (CAEMC).17 
The constitutive treaties for these sub-regional economic 
communities also establish their own judicial bodies and, furthermore, 
outline the conditions under which specific entities are legally entitled 
to refer matters before them. These judicial institutions, which are 
constituted as either sub-regional tribunals or courts, are mandated 
with the interpretation and application of treaty provisions, as well as 
the resolution of disputes.18 The sub-regional trade judiciaries on the 
African continent, which have been established under regional trade 
treaties with the above jurisdictional mandate, include the Court of 
Justice of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU Court),19 the Common 
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa Court of Justice (COMESA 
Court),20 the East African Court of Justice (EAC Court),21 the 
Economic Community of Central African States Community Court of 
Justice (ECCAS Court),22 the Economic Community of West African 
States Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS Court),23 and the 
Southern Africa Development Community Tribunal (SADC 
Tribunal).24 
The establishment of sub-regional trade judicial bodies is an 
important step as it provides a mechanism through which private 
applicants, including individuals and non-State entities, may 
challenge the procedural and substantive legality of State action under 
the relevant community law.25 This Article focuses on the locus standi 
and access provisions, particularly those of private applicants, under 
the constitutive regional integration treaties in Africa. It seeks to 
appraise, from a comparative perspective, the manner in which the 
sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa have handled the issue of the 
 
17 Treaty Establishing the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, Mar. 
1994 [hereinafter the CAEMC Treaty] (establishing the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community). 
18 Ruppel, supra note 4, at 281–82. 
19 AMU Treaty, supra note 9, at art. 13. 
20 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 7(1)(c). 
21 EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 23. 
22 ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at arts. 6(1)(c), 15. 
23 Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice, July 6, 1991 [hereinafter 
ECOWAS Protocol]. 
24 SADC Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 9; VILJOEN, supra note 2, at 505 
25 Solomy Balungi Bbosa, A Critique of the East African Court of Justice as a Human 
Rights Court, in THE PROTECTORS: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN EAST AFRICA 284, 285 (Chris Maina Peter ed., 2008); Oppong, 
supra note 1, at 209–10. 
2011] Friends, Persons, Citizens 359 
locus standi and access of private applicants. Drawing from the 
emerging jurisprudence of the sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa, 
this Article compares the relative extent to which the locus standi and 
access of individuals and non-State entities has been addressed. 
I 
LOCUS STANDI AND ACCESS: THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF 
PRIVATE APPLICANTS BEFORE AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL TRADE 
JUDICIARIES 
An applicant’s locus standi before a judicial body speaks to one’s 
status from a procedural perspective. In this regard, the procedural 
status of private applicants denotes their legal capacity to refer 
matters to these judicial bodies. The access of private applicants to 
sub-regional trade judiciaries is contingent on the locus standi 
provisions in their constituent treaties. This means that the rules 
governing locus standi determine and regulate the access of private 
applicants to sub-regional trade judicial bodies. 
The locus standi provisions under the sub-regional trade treaties in 
the African region are intimately linked with the jurisdictional 
mandate of the respective judicial bodies.26 The jurisdictional 
mandate of these sub-regional judicial bodies includes, inter alia: i) 
the interpretation, application and enforcement of community law;27 
ii) the settlement of disputes involving member States;28 iii) the 
judicial review of a member State action which is alleged to be in 
contravention of the community law;29 iv) addressing the non-
compliance with, or breaches of, member States’ obligations under 
the community law;30 v) ensuring the respect and observance of 
 
26 Onoria, supra note 7, at 145–46. 
27 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 19; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at arts. 23, 
27(1), 33(2); ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at arts. 16(2), 16(3)(c); ECOWAS Treaty, 
supra note 14 at, arts. 15, 76; ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 23, at art. 9; SADC Treaty, 
supra note 16, at arts. 9, 16; Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, art. 
14, Aug. 7, 2000 [hereinafter SADC Protocol]. 
28 ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 76(2); ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 
83. 
29 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 14; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 28(3); 
COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at arts. 24(2), 26; ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 
16(3). 
30 EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at arts. 28(1), 29(1); ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at 
art. 9(2)(k); COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at arts. 24(1), 25(1). 
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human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;31 and vi) the rendering 
of advisory opinions.32 
The constitutive treaties (and protocols thereto) establishing sub-
regional trade blocs with their respective judicial bodies make 
provisions for the access and locus standi of specified entities to 
present applications arising from matters within the jurisdictional 
competence of the concerned judicial body.33 Applications before 
these sub-regional judicial bodies may be made by: i) State parties;34 
ii) institutions and organs of the sub-regional trade entity;35 and iii) 
natural and legal persons.36 In this regard, it has been observed that 
regional trade judiciaries in Africa “entertain a broad range of 
disputes from an extremely broad category of litigants.”37 
It is interesting, however, to note that the generous provisions of 
locus standi and access to the sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa 
have only begun to be utilized relatively recently.38 This makes for a 
rather odd, but nevertheless interesting, set of circumstances to get 
one’s mind around, considering that some of these sub-regional trade 
communities were established as early as the late 1970s (ECOWAS) 
and the early 1980s (COMESA). An examination of the history of the 
various judicial bodies of sub-regional trade entities in Africa reveals 
a slow institutional start-up. For instance, the adoption of the Protocol 
establishing the SADC Tribunal and its pertinent rules of procedure 
only occurred in 2000—ten years after the adoption of the constitutive 
treaty.39 Moreover, the SADC Tribunal only received its first case in 
2007. 
 
31 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 14; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 27(2); 
ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 9. 
32 SADC Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 16(4); SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 20; 
ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 15, 76; ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 23, at art. 
10; ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at arts. 9(2)(L), 16(3)(d); EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at 
art. 36. 
33 Onoria, supra note 7, at 146. 
34 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15, 17; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 28; 
COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 24; ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 23, at art. 9(2). 
35 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15, 17; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 28; 
COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 24; ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 23, at art. 9(2). 
36 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15, 18; EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 30; 
COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 26; Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, art. 10, Jan. 1, 2005, [hereinafter ECOWAS 
Supplementary Protocol]. 
37 James Thuo Gathii, The Under-Appreciated Jurisprudence of Africa’s Regional 
Trade Judiciaries, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 245, 245 (2010). 
38 Oppong, supra note 1, at 203; Onoria, supra note 7, at 146. 
39 Supra note 24. 
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Similarly, the ECOWAS Court had its first judges appointed in 
January 2001—ten years after its establishment under a protocol—
and received its first reference only in 2004.40 Whilst the EAC and 
COMESA Courts have fared relatively better than their above-
mentioned counterparts, their institutional start-up progress similarly 
proffers little to write home about. The EAC Court was inaugurated in 
December 2001, its rules of procedure were adopted in 2004, while its 
first reference was received a year later, in 2005.41 For its part, the 
COMESA Court had its first judges appointed in June 1998 and heard 
its first cases in 2002.42 
This remarkable disjunction between the time of a sub-regional 
entity’s establishment and the operation of its respective judicial 
body—a curiosity which figures similarly across many of Africa’s 
sub-regional economic integration entities—is attributable to the 
failure to expeditiously constitute the relevant judicial bodies and to 
adopt the pertinent enabling procedural rules. Another reason for the 
disjunction lies with a technical aspect of the initial sub-regional 
economic integration treaties, whereby the treaties had been drafted to 
defer the establishment of a judicial body to a subsequent putative 
future protocol.43 A notable cause for concern with these prospective 
formulations is the fact that they do not impose an obligation on the 
State parties to the constitutive sub-regional economic integration 
treaties to ratify the protocols establishing the respective judicial 
bodies.44 Illustrative in this regard are the examples of sub-regional 
trade judiciaries in Africa including the SADC Tribunal45 and the 
ECOWAS Court.46 It is noteworthy that in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Ltd case brought before the SADC Tribunal, the government of 
Zimbabwe sought to exploit this technical flaw by arguing, inter alia, 
that it was not bound by the Tribunal’s decision as it had not ratified 
the SADC Protocol.47 
 
40 Adewale Banjo, The ECOWAS Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West 
Africa, 32 AFR. DEV., 69, 69 (2007); Onoria, supra note 7, at 146. 
41 Onoria, supra note 7, at 147. 
42 Id. at 146. 
43 Id. at 147. 
44 Id. 
45 SADC Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 9. 
46 ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 15(2). 
47 Press Release, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Status and Meaning of 
Ratification of SADC Treaty and Tribunal Protocol (Aug. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.hrforumzim.org/pressreleases/status-and-meaning-of-ratification-of-sadc         
-treaty-and-tribunal-protocol/. 
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It is discernible from the above presentation of the timelines of the 
establishment and subsequent operation of these judicial bodies that 
there exists a remarkable disjunction with regard to the utilization of 
these bodies. Even more notable is the fact that these judicial bodies 
have hardly been used to resolve trade disputes, even though many 
are specified as trade judiciaries.48 Yet, there are valid reasons to be 
found within the African system of sub-regional economic integration 
for this apparent oddity. First, the constitutive treaties for sub-regional 
economic integration do not proffer adequate provisions in respect of 
the settlement of disputes arising between sub-regional trade organs 
or institutions and States.49 For instance, no provision regarding the 
settlement of a dispute arising between a sub-regional trade organ and 
a state is made under either the EAC or COMESA treaties.50 
Particularly telling in this regard is the Calist Mwatela case where 
individual members of the East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA), rather than EALA itself, brought an application challenging 
the alleged overreaching of the EAC Council of Ministers into an area 
which fell within the legislative competence of the EALA.51 
Moreover, in most instances, even when such provision is made, 
for example under Article 17 of the SADC Protocol, it is 
characterized by limitations. This is well illustrated by the EAC and 
COMESA Treaties. In spite of the fact that both treaties confer 
referral rights to their respective judicial bodies upon the Secretary 
Generals, the execution of this function is subject to the further 
authorization of other sub-regional organs.52 The James Katabazi case 
provides an indication of the EAC Court’s jurisprudential recognition 
of the potentially significant, if contingent, role of the Secretary 
General in this regard.53 
Secondly, the sub-regional trade judiciaries that were subsequently 
established were utilized very rarely, owing to States’ preference for 
diplomatic, as opposed to judicial, avenues of dispute settlement.54 
This apparent priority of non-judicial dispute resolution finds support 
 
48 William J. Davey, The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and Regional Agreements, 8 
WORLD TRADE REV. 5, 15 (2009); VILJOEN, supra note 2, at 502–06. 
49 Onoria, supra note 7, at 147. 
50 Id. 
51 Onoria, supra note 7, at note 34 (citing Mwatela v. E. African Comty., EACJ 
Reference No. 1/2005). 
52 EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 29; COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 25. 
53 Katabazi v. Sec’y Gen. of the E. Afr. Cmty., Reference No. 1 of 2007, 24–25 (E. Afr. 
Ct. of J. 2007), http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACJ/2007/3.html. 
54 Onoria, supra note 7, at 147. 
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in the provisions of most African sub-regional trade treaties. These 
treaties require that disputes arising from the interpretation or 
application of the respective treaties first be addressed through 
amicable means; if amicable means fail, parties “may” then proceed 
by judicial means.55 The use of the word “may” in these provisions is 
particularly telling as it suggests that recourse to a judicial solution in 
such disputes is optional. Moreover, the structuring of the enabling 
provisions which allows for the referral of disputes by the political 
organs of the sub-regional trade entities to their respective judicial 
bodies is highly restrictive. A remarkable example in this regard is 
Article 8(3)(k) of the AEC Treaty which requires an ‘absolute 
majority’ vote within its political organ before the dispute resolution 
authority is ceded to the AEC Court. The only inter-State dispute in a 
temporal period spanning forty-odd years where a judicial solution 
was sought before a sub-regional judiciary is Ethiopia v. Eritrea.56 
Given the apparent aversion to judicial solutions to arising disputes, a 
plausible explanation emerges regarding the under-utilization of these 
judicial bodies. 
For a long time the limited role of sub-regional trade judiciaries in 
Africa has been mirrored in the restricted participation and scant 
involvement of individuals and non-State entities in the economic 
integration efforts.57 This, in turn, engendered a direct and adverse 
knock-on effect on the presentation of references arising in respect of 
legal disputes involving a State party, by natural and legal persons. 
These were conspicuously missing. This was due, in large part, to 
limited—or absent altogether—provisions in the majority of sub-
regional trade treaties conferring legal capacity upon private 
applicants, including individuals and non-State entities, to bring 
references before the relevant judicial bodies. 
Incrementally, however, natural and legal persons began taking on 
increasingly prominent roles in the sub-regional economic integration 
process, most notably within the context of the European 
Community58 and the World Trade Organization.59 The gradual 
 
55 ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 76; ECCAS Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 83; 
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, art. 87(1), June 3, 1991 
[hereinafter AEC Treaty]. 
56 Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Ref. No. 1 of 1999, (Common Mkt. E. & S. Afr. Ct. of J. 2001), 
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/COMESACJ/2001/1.html; Onoria, supra note 7, at 148. 
57 Onoria, supra note 7, at 148. 
58 It is significant to note that some of the landmark decisions issued by the European 
Court of Justice were in respect of matters in which the applicants were individual persons. 
See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlands Administratice der Belastingen,  
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expansion of the role and locus standi of private applicants before 
sub-regional trade judiciaries may be partly attributed to the emerging 
prominence of human rights within the context of supranational trade 
and the subsequent extension of the jurisdictional mandate of sub-
regional trade judiciaries in this regard.60 Indeed, in Africa there has 
been a remarkably exponential use of sub-regional trade judiciaries to 
address issues of human rights, which are arguably well beyond their 
treaty defined jurisdictional bases.61 The role of individuals and non-
State entities in litigation before sub-regional trade judiciaries is vital 
as it provides a welcome avenue for private enforcement to 
complement public enforcement mechanisms of community law.62 
The multiple benefits of the increasing role of private applicants 
litigating before sub-regional trade judicial bodies to the broader 
process of economic integration has been succinctly captured thus: 
Direct individual [and non-State entity] access to regional courts 
increases the number of persons that may potentially bring cases, 
provides a means for overcoming the traditional reluctance of 
[S]tates to sue each other, performs the constitutional function of 
limiting the power of governments to decide which disputes are 
worth litigating, minimizes governments’ control over which claims 
can be brought, and potentially guarantees greater governmental 
compliance with community law since governments are aware that 
breaches will not go uncontested.63 
With particular reference to the situation in the African context, it 
was only until the 1990s that individuals and non-State entities began 
playing any meaningful role in the broader process of regional 
integration. A notable example is the COMESA Treaty which 
inaugurated in 1991 the provision of locus standi for individuals to 
present references before its Tribunal.64 This, in effect, made for a 
 
1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v Enel, 1964 E.C.R 585. See generally, ALBERTINA 
ALBORS-LLORENS, PRIVATE PARTIES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: CHALLENGING 
COMMUNITY MEASURES (1996). 
59 Onoria, supra note 7, at 148–49. 
60 Solomon T. Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-regional Courts in Africa: 
Prospects and Challenges, 17 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 80 (2009); See VILJOEN, 
supra note 2, at 502–06. 
61 See Katabazi, supra note 53 (The EAC Court observed in its dicta that even though it 
did not have an express human rights mandate deriving from Article 27 of the EAC 
Treaty, it would “not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under 
Article 27(1) merely because the Reference includes allegations of human rights 
violation.”); Gathii, supra note 37, at 245. 
62 Oppong, supra note 1, at 210. 
63 Id. 
64 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, at art. 26; Onoria, supra note 7, at 149. 
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more enabling environment for individual participation in the broader 
economic integration process. The primary reason for the delay in 
individual and non-State entity participation was because the initial 
treaties on regional and sub-regional economic integration were silent 
regarding their locus standi and access to the respective judicial 
bodies established under these treaties. However, through 
amendments and supplementary provisions including protocols and 
the adoption of new treaties altogether, much more accommodating 
provisions for the access and locus standi of private applicants were 
made.65 
Under the regime of the SADC Treaty, the locus standi of 
individuals was provided for by way of a protocol adopted in 2000. In 
contrast, the regime of the EAC Treaty granted, from the onset, locus 
standi to individuals and non-State applicants to bring references 
before the EAC Court.66 The recognition of the locus standi of private 
applicants before the ECOWAS Court was unlike that of other sub-
regional judicial systems.67 The most unique aspect about it lies in the 
fact that the adoption of its locus standi provisions was the direct 
result of the decision of the ECOWAS Court in Afolabi Olajide, in 
which the Court ruled that the legal competence of individuals before 
the Court was subject to a member State nexus.68 In accordance with 
the international law rule of diplomatic protection, it was ruled that 
applications could only be made before the Court by a State, on 
behalf of its nationals, against another State.69 
The ruling in the Afolabi Olajide case resulted in the 2005 adoption 
of a supplementary protocol to the 1991 Protocol establishing the 
ECOWAS Court.70 Article 10(d) of the resulting ECOWAS 
Supplementary Protocol, which expressly confers locus standi upon 
individuals, is a welcome departure from the hitherto position in 
which only disputes arising between member States could be referred 
to the Court.71 On the whole, these supplementary protocols and 
 
65 Onoria, supra note 7, at 149. 
66 EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 30. 
67 Nneoma Nwogu, Regional Integration as an Instrument of Human Rights: Re-
conceptualizing ECOWAS, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 345, 349 (2007). 
68 Olajide v. Nigeria, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03 (Econ. Cmty. of W. Afr. Sts. Ct. 
of J. 2004), http://www.courtecowas.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=98&Itemid=6&lang=en. 
69 Banjo, supra note 40, at 71; Onoria, supra note 7, at 149. 
70 See Solomon T. Ebobrah, Human Rights Developments in Sub-regional Courts in 
Africa During 2008, 9 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 312, 318 n. 31 (2009); See also Banjo, supra 
note 40 at 71. 
71 Ebobrah, supra note 60, at 86. 
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amendments have made for a more enabling environment with regard 
to the participation of individuals and non-state entities in the regional 
integration process in the African continent. 
II 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LOCUS STANDI AND THE ACCESS OF 
PRIVATE APPLICANTS BEFORE SUB-REGIONAL TRADE 
JUDICIARIES 
The rules governing the locus standi and access of private 
applicants, specifically individuals and non-State entities, to sub-
regional judicial bodies are found in each of the constituent treaties 
and protocols that create the judicial bodies themselves. Discernible 
from these treaties and their protocols is the fact that varying 
provisions are made for the locus standi and access of private 
applicants to their respective judicial bodies. These provisions vary 
between those that are narrow and restrictive on one end of the 
spectrum, to those that are broad and permissive on the other. 
The access provision under the ECOWAS Treaty regime is 
enshrined in Article 10 of the ECOWAS Protocol, which provides 
that access to the Court is open to: 
c) individuals and corporate bodies in proceedings from the 
determination of an act or inaction of a Community official 
which violates the rights of the individuals or corporate bodies; 
d) individuals on application for relief for violation of their human 
rights; the submission of application for which shall: 
i) not be anonymous; nor 
ii) be made whilst the same matter has been instituted before 
another international Court for adjudication.72 
It is notable that although ECOWAS is a sub-regional trade 
organization, under the above Protocol the provision of locus standi 
for private applicants before the ECOWAS Court is such that it 
entertains applications arising from the violation of human rights.73 
However, the jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court, as is well 
illustrated by the Moussa Léo Kéïta case,74 indicates that such 
broadened access by private applicants is only available in respect to 
 
72 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol, supra note 36, at art. 10. 
73 Ebobrah, supra note 58, at 86. 
74 See Kéïta v. Mali, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06 (Econ. Cmty. of W. Afr. Sts. Ct. 
of J. 2007), http://www.courtecowas.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=78&Itemid=6&lang=en. 
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specifically identified human rights violations. Another important 
point to be noted with regard to the ECOWAS Protocol is the fact that 
its provision on the access and locus standi of private applicants is not 
unqualified—it is subject to an additional admissibility precondition. 
It is a requirement that the subject matter of the reference should not 
have been submitted before any other international dispute settlement 
procedure. While, on the one hand, this requirement is positive as it 
excludes forum shopping among private applicants,75 a demerit 
attributable to it lies in the fact that this aspect blocks any opportunity 
for appeal. 
The provision for the locus standi of private applicants with regard 
to human rights as a subject matter compares favorably with Article 
30 of the ACJHR Protocol. Article 30 provides: 
The following entities shall also be entitled to submit cases to the 
Court on any violation of a right guaranteed by the African Charter, 
by the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa, or any other legal instrument relevant to 
human rights ratified by the States Parties concerned . . . 
e) African National Human Rights Institutions; 
f) Individuals or relevant Non-Governmental Organizations 
accredited to the African Union or to its organs, subject to 
the provisions of Article 8 of the Protocol.76 
However, it is noteworthy that while Article 28 of the ACJHR 
Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice to 
disputes arising from “acts, decisions, regulations and directives of 
organs of the [African] Union,” there is no express provision for the 
locus standi of private applicants with regard to such disputes.77 
On the matter of the locus standi of private applicants, Article 30 
of the EAC Treaty provides: 
Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of this Treaty, any person 
who is resident in a Partner State may refer for determination by the 
Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or 
action of a Partner State or an institution of the Community on the 
 
75 See VILJOEN, supra note 2, at 502; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for 
Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 285 (1999). 
76 Article 30, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), (entered into force 21 October 
1986). 
77 Onoria, supra note 7, at 152. 
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grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is 
unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty.78 
Article 30 grants a liberal locus standi provision to individuals and 
non-State entities, a fact that is clearly indicated by the jurisprudence 
of the EAC Court.79 It is of notable significance that Article 27 of the 
EAC Treaty places an additional requirement on the EAC Court’s 
jurisdiction over references by private applicants. It requires that such 
references should entail the interpretation and application of the EAC 
Treaty. Another important observation is the fact that the EAC Treaty 
provides broad locus standi to residents of any of the Partner States. 
This bears enormous significance as it widens the bracket of persons 
who are entitled to bring references before the EAC Court by making 
it possible for non-citizens of the EAC to bring complaints against 
any of the Partner States. 
Similar to the ECOWAS and ACJHR Protocols, both of which 
make provision for the locus standi and access of private applicants in 
respect to human rights violations, the SADC Protocol empowers the 
SADC Tribunal to entertain references brought by individuals and 
non-State entities pertaining to disputes with member States regarding 
violations of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The Mike 
Campbell case, which was brought by private applicants, illustrates 
the pragmatic application of the locus standi provision relative to 
alleged human rights violations under the SADC Protocol.80 Article 
15 of the SADC Protocol provides that: 
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between 
States, and between natural or legal persons and States. 
2. No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a State 
unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is 
unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. 
3. Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the 
consent of other parties to the dispute shall not be required.81 
An important point that is discernible from the above provision is 
the fact that references may only be brought by private applicants 
against member States. This precludes any application which may 
 
78 EAC Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 30. 
79 Standard Chartered Fin. Servs. v. Ct. App. for the Rep. of Kenya, Reference No. 
4/2002 (Common Mkt. for E. and S. Afr. Ct. of J. 2002). 
80 See Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007 
(S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2007), http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008 /2.pdf. 
81 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15. 
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arise from a dispute between two or more private applicants.82 The 
emerging jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal, particularly the Albert 
Fungai case83 and the Nixon Chirinda case,84 is supportive of this 
contention. Also noteworthy is the fact that Article 19 of the SADC 
Protocol makes further provision for the access and locus standi of a 
particular group of private applicants—employees of the SADC— 
particularly regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. 
The cases of Bookie Kethusegile-Juru,85 Ernest Francis Mtingwi,86 
and Angelo Mondlane87 are good examples of the enhanced grant of 
access by private applicants to the SADC Tribunal in this regard. 
Another significant point to be noted regarding the locus standi and 
access of private applicants under the regime of the SADC Treaty is 
the priority of the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies. Under 
Article 15(2) of the SADC Protocol, the access of private applicants 
before the SADC Tribunal is qualified by a requirement that the 
available remedies at the national level be sought first.88 Failure to 
satisfy this requirement deprives the prospective applicant of the 
requisite locus standi to bring a reference.89 Noteworthy also, is the 
fact that, like under the EAC Treaty, it is a requirement that 
references by individuals or non-State entities should relate to the 
application and interpretation of a States’ obligations under the SADC 
Treaty.90 
 
82 Oliver C. Ruppel & Francois-X. Bangamwabo, The SADC Tribunal: A Legal 
Analysis of its Mandate and Role in Regional Integration, in 8 MONITORING REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN S. AFR. YEARBOOK 179, 188 (Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2008). 
83 Mutize v. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd., Case No. SADC (T) 8/2008 (S. Afr. Dev. 
Comty. Trib. 2008), http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/case082008.pdf. 
84 Chirinda v. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd., Case No. SADC (T) 9/2008 (S. Afr. Dev. 
Comty. Trib. 2008), http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/case092008.pdf. 
85 Kethusegile-Juru v. The S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Parliamentary Forum, Case No. SADC 
(T) 02/2009 (S. Afr. Dev. Comty. Trib. 2009). 
86 Mtingwi v. SADC Secretariat, Case No. SADC (T) 01/2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Comty. 
Trib. 2007), http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/case012007.pdf. 
87 Mondlane v SADC Secretariat, Case No. SADC (T) 07/2009 (S. Afr. Dev. Comty. 
Trib. 2009), http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/docs/case072009.pdf. 
88 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15(2), “No natural or legal person shall bring 
an action against a State unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable 
to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction.” 
89 Ruppel & Bangamwabo, supra note 82, at 189; A.A. CANCADO TRINDADE, THE 
APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1 (1983). 
90 SADC Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 14. 
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The access and locus standi provision for private applicants under 
the COMESA Treaty is similarly subject to the local remedies rule. 
Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty provides: 
Any person who is resident in a Member State may refer for 
determination by the Court the legality of any act, regulation, 
directive, or decision of the Council or of a Member State on the 
grounds that such act, directive, decision or regulation is unlawful 
or an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty: 
Provided that where the matter for determination relates to any act, 
regulation, directive or decision by a Member State, such person 
shall not refer the matter for determination under this Article unless 
he has first exhausted local remedies in the national courts or 
tribunals of the Member State.91 
A notable similarity between the above provision and the EAC 
Treaty is the locus standi provision under the COMESA Treaty which 
grants competence to all persons who are residents in a Member 
State.92 This grants fairly liberal access to non-citizens of the pertinent 
Eastern and Southern Africa States. Yet, similar to the SADC 
Protocol, it is important to note that such competence exists only to 
the extent that the private applicant has “first exhausted local 
remedies” that are available in the national judicial system.93 It is also 
noteworthy that, like the SADC Protocol, Article 27 of the COMESA 
Treaty makes provision for specific references by the employees of 
the COMESA in respect of the terms and conditions of their 
employment. Examples of references which have been brought before 
the COMESA Court under this provision include the Kabeta Muleya 
case94 and the Martin Ogang case.95 
 
91 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, art. 26. 
92 Onoria, supra note 7, at 152–53. 
93 Id. at 153. 
94 Muleya v. Common Mkt. for E. and S. Afr., Ref. No. 1/2003 (Common Mkt. for E. 
& S. Afr. Ct. of J. 2003). 
95 E. & S. Afr. Trade and Dev. Bank v. Ogang, Ref. No. 1B/2000 (Common Mkt. for E. 
& S. Afr. Ct. of J. 2002), http://www.worldcourts.com/comesacj/eng/decisions/2002.04.26 
_PTA_Bank_v_Ogang.htm. 
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III 
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES OF AFRICAN SUB-REGIONAL TRADE 
JUDICIARIES TO THE LOCUS STANDI AND ACCESS OF PRIVATE 
APPLICANTS 
A.  The Notion of Direct and Conditional Access to Judicial Bodies 
The extent of the jurisdictional reach of sub-regional trade 
judiciaries in Africa to address applications brought by individuals 
and non-state entities is contingent on the access provisions contained 
in the respective constituent economic integration treaties. The 
provisions for access to the various sub-regional trade judiciaries in 
Africa vary from liberal at one end of the spectrum to restrictive at the 
other end. The access of individuals or non-state entities to these 
judicial bodies arises through one of two ways: direct access or  
conditional access. In the following section, these methods of access 
to judicial bodies are discussed. 
1.  Direct Access 
Direct access to judicial recourse mechanisms refers to the type of 
access that precludes any additional conditions. Under direct access, 
individuals and non-state entities may automatically bring references 
before sub-regional trade judicial bodies without necessarily fulfilling 
other supplementary requirements, such as exhausting local remedies. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the direct access of private applicants 
to supranational judicial forums is a mechanism that is unpopular with 
most States, and has even been deeply contested in some instances.96 
Reasons for the suspicion with which States regard direct access to 
supra-natural judicial bodies range from reputational97 and 
sovereignty98 concerns on the one hand, to concerns of efficiency99 
 
96 Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 51, 80 (1996). 
97 Malawi Afr. Ass’n v. Mauritania, Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 and 
210/98 ¶ 80 (Afr. Comm on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2000), http://www.achpr.org 
/english/Decison_Communication/Mauritania/Comm.%2054-91....pdf (The local remedies 
rule enables a State to “save its reputation, which would be inevitably tarnished if it were 
brought before an international jurisdiction.”); Amnesty Int’l v. Sudan, Comm. Nos. 48/90, 
50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ¶ 32 (Afr. Comm on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1999), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/Decison_Communication/Sudan/Comm.48-90.pdf; Chidi 
Anselm Odinkalu, The Role of Case and Complaints Procedures in the Reform of the 
African Regional Human Rights System, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 225, 242 (2001). 
98 Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, Comm. Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, ¶ 36 
(Afr. Comm on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1995), http://www.achpr.org/english 
/Decison_Communication/DRC/Comm.%2025-89,47-90,56-91,100-93.pdf (“[A 
sovereign] government should have notice of a human rights violation in order to have the  
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and the need to avoid contradictory judgments at national and 
international levels on the other.100 Nonetheless, examples of direct 
access to sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa are found in the 
ECOWAS and EAC treaty regimes. Both treaties are silent with 
regard to the requirement of exhausting local remedies before 
individuals and non-state entities bring references to their respective 
judicial bodies.101 As a result of this silence, the ECOWAS and EAC 
Courts have been inclined to interpret their respective treaties as 
presiding over the immaterial nature of fulfilling the requirement of 
exhausting local remedies.102 
In searching for the trends that serve as representations of the bold 
approach adopted by some sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa 
towards the development of jurisprudence on direct access, the 
contribution of the ECOWAS Court merits notable mention. In the 
Hadijatou Manu Koraou case, a citizen of Niger brought a reference 
against Niger on the premise that the State had failed to protect her 
right not to be subjected to slavery, a condition under which she had 
laboured and endured for most of her life.103 The ECOWAS Court 
found in favour of the direct access of the individual applicant by 
ruling that exhaustion of local remedies was inapplicable.104 
Moreover, the local remedies rule was held to be irrelevant as a 
precondition for admissibility—more so in respect to a human rights 
complaint.105 The ECOWAS Court similarly dismissed objections on 
the grounds of admissibility which were raised in the preliminary 
stages of the Prof. Etim Moses Essien case. These objections were 
 
opportunity to remedy such violations before being called before an international 
jurisdiction.”); Frans Viljoen, Admissibility under the African Charter, in THE AFRICAN 
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 76, 77 (Malcolm 
Evans & Rachel Murray eds., 2002) (As an admissibility requirement, the local remedies 
rule “places a further divide between sovereign States and international supervision.”). 
99 Akdivar v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R 143 (1996); Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far, So 
Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 2003 (2003). 
100 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, AHRLR 60 ¶ 37, 
(Afr. Comm on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2001). 
101 Onoria, supra note 7, at 153. 
102 Id. at 156. 
103 Peter Walker, Niger Guilty in Landmark Slavery Case, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 
2008. 
104 Koraou v. Niger, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08 (Econ. Cmty. of W. Afr. Sts. Ct. of J. 
2008), http://www.worldcourts.com/ecowasccj/eng/decisions/2008.10.27_Koraou_v 
_Niger.htm. 
105 Id. at ¶ 40, 49. 
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essentially premised on the non-fulfillment of the rule on exhaustion 
of local remedies.106 
The decisions of the ECOWAS Court in the cases of Hadijatou 
Manu Koraou and Prof. Etim Moses Essien represent a clear 
departure from the established African human rights jurisprudence on 
the exhaustion of local remedies rule, particularly that of the African 
Commission.107 In this regard, the Court indicated that despite the fact 
that the ECOWAS Treaty regime refers to the African Charter, this 
was only a provision making the African Charter part of the 
applicable law.108 Hence, this does not necessarily imply that the 
conditions for access and admissibility should be the same ones 
provided for under the African Charter.109 
Direct access is also provided for under the EAC Treaty regime, 
which, as is the case under the ECOWAS Treaty regime, is silent on 
the need for individual and non-State applicants to fulfill the 
requirement of exhausting local remedies. In this regard, in the 
Anyang’ Nyong’o case, the EAC Court interpreted the provisions of 
Article 30 of the EAC Treaty as ‘creating a cause of action,’110 thus 
conferring upon individuals and non-State entities resident in East 
Africa the ‘right of direct access to the Court.’111 Proceeding from this 
point of departure, the Court then reasoned that the conferment on 
applicants of the right of direct access to the EAC Court precluded the 
relevance of the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies.112 
2.  Conditional Access 
Conditional access to judicial bodies established under sub-
regional economic integration treaties is premised on the rule of the 
exhaustion of local remedies, the épuisement des voies de recours 
internes.113 This rule has been described as requiring that “a State . . . 
be given the opportunity to redress an alleged wrong within the 
 
106 Essien v. Gambia, Case No. ECW/CCJ/APP/05/05 (Econ. Cmty. of W. Afr. Sts. Ct. 
of J. 2007), http://www.worldcourts.com/ecowasccj/eng/decisions/2007.03.14_Essien 
_v_Gambia.htm. 
107 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 56, June 27, 1981, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter African Charter]. 
108 Koraou, ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08 at ¶ 41. 
109 Id. ¶¶ 42–43; Onoria, supra note 7, at 156. 
110 Anyang Nyong’o v. Att’y Gen. of Kenya, Reference No. 1/2006. ¶ 18 (E. Afr. Ct. of 
J. 2007), http://www.worldcourts.com/eacj/eng/decisions/2007.03.30_Nyong_o_v 
_Attorney_General_Kenya.htm. 
111 Id. ¶ 54. 
112 Id.; Onoria, supra note 7, at 156. 
113 Udombana, supra note 99, at 3. 
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framework of its own domestic legal system before its international 
responsibility can be called into question at [the] international 
level.”114 The local remedy has been clarified as specifically entailing 
“remedy sought from courts of a judicial nature.”115 Hence, other 
remedies sought in forums of a non-judicial nature, for instance those 
of quasi-judicial entities, will not suffice.116 Additionally, the 
remedies must be “available, effective and sufficient.”117 Thus, the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule requires that, as an initial course of 
action, the individuals or non-State entities who eventually bring 
references before supranational judicial bodies must have engaged 
those remedies that are available under the judicial structure within 
the concerned State party.118 This implies a duty on States to ensure 
the existence of such remedies locally.119 
The rationale for exhaustion of local remedies is to enable local 
courts to first deal with the matter because they are well placed to 
deal with the legal issues involving national law before them. It also 
ensures that the international tribunal does not deal with cases 
which could easily have been disposed of by national courts.120 
 
114 Ruppel & Bangamwabo, supra note 82, at 1. 
115 Cudjoe v. Ghana, Comm. No. 221/98 ¶ 31 (Afr. Comm on Human and People’s 
Rights 1999). 
116 See VILJOEN, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
117 Jawara v. Gambia, Comm. 147/95, 149/96, ¶ 31 (Afr. Comm on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 2000); J. G. v. Neth., Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 39th Sess., July 
9–27, 1990, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, A/45/40, at 180 (Oct. 4, 1990); Pratt 
and Morgan v. Jamaica, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 35th Sess., Mar. 20–Apr. 7, 
1989, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, A/44/40, at 222 (Sept. 29, 1989); Van 
Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1982); Steel v. United 
Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R., 603 (1999); De Jong v. The Netherlands, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R., 20, 
33 (1986); Hashman & Harrup v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R., 241 (2000); Vernillo 
v. France, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 880, 885 (1991). 
118 2 GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE 686 (1986). It is noteworthy that this rule requires applicants to adduce 
prima facie evidence outlining the steps which they have taken in their attempt to exhaust 
the available local remedies. See Dumbaya v. Gambia, Comm. No. 127/94 (Afr. Comm on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1994–1995); Ceesay v. Gambia, Comm. No. 86/93 (Afr. 
Comm on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1994–1995). 
119 SERAC v. Nigeria, Comm. 155/96, ¶ 37 (Afr. Comm on Human and People’s 
Rights 2002) (“Where a right is not well provided for in domestic law . . . there cannot be 
effective remedies, or any remedies at all.”); Recontre Africaine pour la Défence de Droits 
de l’Homme v. Zambia, Comm. No. 71/92, ¶ 12 (Afr. Comm on Human and People’s 
Rights 1996–1997); Velásquez Rodríguez, Preliminary Objections, 1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C), ¶ 88 (1987). 
120 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007, 20 
(S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2007), available at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008 
/2.pdf. 
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It is noteworthy that the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies 
figures prominently as a precondition for admissibility under most 
international human rights treaties,121 and moreover, it has since come 
to be regarded as a general principle of international law.122 In certain 
jurisdictions, it has even been found to be a rule of customary 
international law.123 Under the SADC Protocol, the local remedies 
rule restricts the capacity of natural or legal persons to bring a 
reference against a member State “unless he or she has exhausted all 
available remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic 
jurisdiction.”124 However, it is important to note that the precondition 
of fulfilling the requirements of the exhaustion of local remedies rule 
under the SADC Protocol, as is the case under other supranational 
regimes, is not absolute.125 On the contrary, under certain 
circumstances, notably in references brought against the organs or 
institutions of the Community, the rule does not apply.126 
The Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case presented the SADC Tribunal 
with an opportunity through which the rule on the exhaustion of local 
remedies could be addressed. The applicants in this case, individuals 
as well as non-State entities, were disenfranchised land owners. They 
brought a reference seeking to challenge the lawfulness of 
Zimbabwe’s compulsory land acquisition program, under which 
agricultural land was expropriated by the State and redistributed to 
 
121 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 41(1)(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art, 2, 5(2)(b), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171; Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 35(1), Apr. 11, 1950, 
C.E.T.S. No. 005; American Convention on Human Rights art. 46(1), Nov. 22, 1969; 
African Charter, supra note 75, at art. 56(5); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A), at ¶ 159 (1979); Udombana, supra note 99, at 2; A.O. Adede, A Survey of Treaty 
Provisions on the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 18 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (1977). 
122 Udombana, supra note 99, at 3, 13; C.F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 n.12 (1990) (“[The] development of the rule [on the exhaustion of 
local remedies] in recent years has been dependent almost entirely on judicial or quasi-
judicial determination by international tribunals or organs.”). 
123 Interhandel (Switz. v. U. S.), Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (1959) (“The 
rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be 
instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law.”); Finnish Shipowners 
(Fin. v. Gr. Brit.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, 1499 (1934); Ambatielos Claim (Gr. v. U.K.), 12 
R.I.A.A 83, 119 (1956); Jost Delbrück, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and the 
International Protection of Human Rights, in DES MENSCHEN RECHT ZWISCHEN FREIHEIT 
UND VERANTWORTUNG 213, 217 (Jürgen Jekewitz et al. eds., 1989). 
124 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, art. 15(2). 
125 Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 148/96, 10–11 (Afr. Comm on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 1999). 
126 SADC Protocol, supra note 27, at art. 15(2); Onoria, supra note 7, at 154. 
376 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 13, 355 
other persons.127 The initial application made by the applicant, a legal 
person, sought for an interim measure of protection to restrain the 
Zimbabwean government from evicting them from their land.128 In 
response, the respondent State sought to discredit the applicants’ 
locus standi by arguing, inter alia, that the applicants had not 
exhausted all the available local remedies owing to the fact that there 
was a case pending before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.129 
However, for its part, the Tribunal ruled that the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule was inapplicable with respect to preliminary 
applications for interim measures.130 Moreover, it was held that the 
invocation of the rule on exhausting local remedies against the 
applicants was premature since the appropriate time lay much further 
ahead during the litigation  on the merits.  The court provided: 
[T]he issue of [the] failure to exhaust local remedies by the 
applicants . . . is not of relevance to the present application but that 
it may only be raised in the main case. It may not be raised in the 
present case in which the applicants are seeking an interim measure 
of protection pending the final determination of the matter. Thus, 
the Tribunal need not consider the issue of whether or not the 
applicants have exhausted local remedies.131 
Upon reaching the merits stage, the SADC Tribunal was 
confronted with the question concerning whether it had jurisdiction or 
not,132 particularly taking into consideration the alleged reason of the 
non-exhaustion of the applicants’ available local remedies.133 Arguing 
on the merits of the case, the applicants sought to challenge an 
Amendment to the Constitution of Zimbabwe134 through which the 
jurisdiction of Zimbabwean Courts was ousted in respect of cases 
relative to the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land by the 
State.135 The ouster clause in Section 16(B)(3)(a) of the amendment 
provides that “a person having any right or interest in [compulsorily 
 
127 Supra note 120. 
128 Id. 
129 Ruppel & Bangamwabo, supra note 82, at 180. 
130 Onoria, supra note 7, at 154–55. 
131 Case No. SADC (T) 2/2007, at 6–7 cited in Onoria, supra note 7, at 155. 
132 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. Republic of Zimbabwe, SADCT Case No. 2/07, (S. 
Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2007), available at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008 
/2.pdf. 
133 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. V. Minister of Nat’l Sec. Responsible for Land, Land 
Reform and Resettlement, Judgment No. SC 49/07 (Zim. Sup. Ct. 2008); Onoria, id., at 
155. 
134 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act 2005. 
135 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd, SADCT Case No. 2/07 at 1; Onoria, supra note 7, at 155. 
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acquired] land . . . shall not apply to a Court to challenge the 
acquisition of the land by the State, and no court shall entertain any 
such challenge.”136 Under these circumstances the applicants were 
effectively rendered unable to institute proceedings under the 
domestic jurisdiction.137 This position was confirmed by the 
Zimbabwean Supreme Court’s decision.138 Hence, in coming to its 
decision, the SADC Tribunal reasoned that the rule on the exhaustion 
of local remedies did not apply owing to the ouster of jurisdiction of 
the available national avenues for securing judicial recourse.139 This 
resonates well with other jurisdictions whose interpretation of the 
local remedies rule is informed by the right to a fair trial and requires, 
inter alia, that the victim of the alleged violation have access to 
judicial mechanisms at the national level that are capable of 
adequately addressing and, where appropriate, redressing the 
complaint.140 
 
136 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd., SADCT Case No. 2/07 at 12. The above provision bears 
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(1985). 
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supra note 82, at 181. 
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Similar to the SADC Protocol, the COMESA Treaty provides for 
the access of individuals and non-State entities to the COMESA Court 
in respect of disputes involving the actions or omissions of the 
Council or a member State which are in violation of the Treaty. 
Moreover, as is also the case with the SADC Protocol, such access is 
qualified by an additional requirement of the exhaustion of local 
remedies. The pertinent provision in the COMESA Treaty reads: 
[W]here the matter for determination relates to any act, regulation, 
directive or decision by a Member State, such person shall not refer 
the matter for determination under this Article unless he has first 
exhausted local remedies in the national courts or tribunals of the 
Member State.141 
The Coastal Acquaculture case presented the COMESA Court with 
an opportunity to address the question of the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule.142 The applicant, Coastal Acquaculture, a corporate 
legal person incorporated under Kenyan laws, sought to restrain the 
Kenyan government from compulsorily acquiring its land.143 The 
applicant alleged that such acquisition was in contravention of the 
law, as the government had failed, inter alia, to pay compensation for 
the land so acquired.144 In response, the respondent State subsequently 
filed an interlocutory application seeking to have the Court set aside 
the initial reference made by Coastal Acquaculture on the grounds of 
the absence of locus standi on the part of the applicant.145 In coming 
to its determination, the Court first sought to verify whether the 
applicant had a legal right to file a reference. This was subsequently 
found in the affirmative since the applicant was a “legal person 
resident in a Member State.”146 
The next step, then, was for the Court to determine whether the 
applicant had fulfilled the other requisite condition: exhausting all 
available local remedies.147 While the applicant had made an attempt 
to engage the locally available avenues for securing judicial recourse 
 
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ 
Obligations Under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 105, 105 
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141 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, art. 26. 
142 Republic of Kenya v. Coastal Acquaculture, Ref. No. 3/2001, (Common Mkt. E. & 
S. Afr. Ct. of J. 2002). 
143 Onoria, supra note 7, at 153. 
144 Id. at 153–54. 
145 Onoria, supra note 7, at 154. 
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at the national level, midway in the course of litigation it withdrew 
the civil action which it had instituted seeking a remedy of 
compensation in damages against the State.148 After the withdrawal of 
the civil suit, the applicant brought the reference before the COMESA 
Court. Although the Court expressed its sympathy over the protracted 
process through which the applicant had attempted to secure local 
remedies,149 the Court determined that the withdrawal by Coastal 
Acquaculture of the civil suit did not “constitute an exhaustion of [its] 
legal remedies in the municipal courts of the Republic of Kenya such 
as to grant [it] a locus standi to commence this [r]eference.”150 
Noteworthy is the fact that the Court’s reasoning in this regard is 
remarkably similar to that of the African Commission in the Civil 
Liberties Organisation case151 where a complaint was ruled 
inadmissible since “a claim had been filed but not yet settled by the 
courts of the respondent state.”152 
Interesting comparisons may be drawn between the relatively 
similar set of circumstances witnessed in the merits stage of the Mike 
Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case and that of the case of Coastal Acquaculture. 
In both cases the decisions of the respective national courts excluded 
the viability of judicial remedies at the national level. More 
specifically, in the Coastal Acquaculture case, the Kenyan Court had 
declared itself to be lacking in sufficient competence to rescind the 
order of compulsory acquisition, which had been issued by the 
Minister.153 Unlike the merits decision in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd 
case, however, the COMESA Court ruled that owing to the fact that 
the civil suit in respect of the compulsory acquisition of the 
respondent’s parcels of land was pending before the Kenyan Court, 
Article 26 of the COMESA Treaty precluded Coastal Acquaculture 
from commencing a reference before the COMESA Court.154 
It is, however, important to note that under the COMESA and 
SADC treaty regimes, the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies 
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applies only with regard to references that are brought by individuals 
and non-state entities against a member state of the Common Market 
or the Community.155 This lends credence to the contention that the 
rule on the exhaustion of local remedies is not absolute. Support for 
this view is found in the jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal. For 
instance, the Tribunal ruled in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case that 
the inability of a private applicant to proceed under domestic 
jurisdiction rendered the ordinarily requisite exhaustion of local 
remedies rule inapplicable.156 In this regard, the SADC Tribunal 
lucidly held: 
[W]here the municipal law does not offer any remedy or the remedy 
that is offered is ineffective, the individual is not required to exhaust 
the local remedies. Further, where . . . ‘the procedure of achieving 
the remedies would have been unduly prolonged,’ the individual is 
not expected to exhaust local remedies.157 
The case of Luke Munyandu Tembani is yet another instance in 
which the exhaustion of local remedies rule under Article 15(2) of the 
SADC Protocol was held to be inapplicable because the jurisdiction 
of Zimbabwean Courts to address claims arising from the compulsory 
acquisition of agricultural land had been excluded by way of a 
constitutional amendment.158 
B.  Access to Judicial Bodies and the Nature of Legal Interest in the 
Litigation 
The access of individuals and non-state entities to supranational 
judicial bodies invariably raises questions regarding their locus standi 
to present such references.159 In many instances the decisive aspect 
will turn on the nature of the legal interest of the concerned individual 
or non-State entity in a particular legal dispute. This means that the 
access of private applicants to sub-regional judicial bodies will be 
conditioned to a significant extent by the nature of the applicant’s 
legal interest in the dispute at hand. Hence, the competence and 
ability of individuals and non-state entities to participate meaningfully 
in litigation before sub-regional trade judiciaries depends largely on 
the nature of their legal interest. 
 
155 COMESA Treaty, supra note 11, art. 26; SADC Protocol, supra note 27, art. 15. 
156 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v Republic of Zimbabwe, SADCT Case No. 2/07, 21 (S. 
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The locus standi requirement which grants individuals and non-
State entities access to sub-regional economic integration judicial 
bodies varies across the African continent. On the one hand, the 
access provisions may be broadened by virtue of a locus standi 
requirement which accommodates actio popularis applications, 
(public interest litigation).160 On the other hand, access may be limited 
by a restrictive locus standi provision requiring that a private 
applicant demonstrate a personal interest in the ratione materiae of 
the legal dispute.161 The locus standi provisions for the access of 
individuals and non-state entities to the EAC and COMESA Courts 
are broad and permissive as references may be presented by “any 
person who is resident” in the member or partner state respectively.162 
The use of the phrase “any person” is particularly telling of the 
generosity of the respective constitutive treaties’ access provisions 
since this phrase is wide enough to incorporate individuals and non-
state applicants. In the case of natural persons, it confers wide access 
to individuals who are not necessarily “citizens” of any of the 
respective member states. 
Moreover, there is nothing in these provisions to indicate the 
requirement of proving a personal interest in the subject matter of the 
application on the part of the concerned private applicant. This 
contention finds support in the decision rendered in the Anyang’ 
Nyong’o case where the EAC Court ruled that the access provisions 
under Articles 28, 29, and 30 of the EAC Treaty require neither that 
the private applicants demonstrate that a personal right or interest has 
been infringed, nor that some damage was occasioned as a result of 
the impugned conduct.163 A notable difference between the EAC and 
COMESA Treaties, however, lies in the fact that under the latter there 
is an additional locus standi condition—the exhaustion of local 
remedies in respect to references against member states.164 
The burgeoning jurisprudence of the EAC Court provides further 
clarification on the extent of its broad and accommodating access 
provisions. In elaborating on the locus standi requirement under the 
EAC Treaty, the Court has clarified that the demonstration of 
personal interest by the applicant is irrelevant. In the East African 
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Law Society case the Court affirmed the locus standi of the applicants, 
legal persons, in bringing the reference.165 More specifically, in 
coming to its decision, the Court reasoned that since the applicants 
were genuinely interested in an alleged contravention of Treaty law, 
exercising the “duty to promote adherence to the rule of law” 
conferred upon them the requisite locus standi.166 The implication of 
this decision to the shaping of the Court’s future jurisprudence is far 
reaching. It not only affirms the Court’s liberal views on private 
applicants’ locus standi and access, but also provides 
acknowledgment for public interest litigation as a legitimate “cause of 
action” and a basis for locus standi. 
The locus standi provisions for the access of individuals and non-
State entities to the ECOWAS Court and SADC Tribunal are also 
fairly liberal, albeit to a relatively lesser extent compared to those 
under the EAC and COMESA Treaties. Under the ECOWAS Treaty 
regime, access to the Court is largely dependent on a demonstration, 
on the part of the applicant, of a personal interest in the concerned 
legal dispute.167 The requirement for applicants to demonstrate their 
personal interest greatly restricts the avenues through which private 
applicants may bring references to the ECOWAS Court. Even so, the 
increasingly expanding jurisdictional reach of sub-regional trade 
judiciaries to include a human rights mandate bears the capacity to 
effectively circumvent this limitation. Similar to the cases of the 
African and other regional systems of human rights protection, a 
fairly high number of the litigation before the ECOWAS Court is 
brought under actio popularis applications on behalf of the victims 
and other affected persons.168 
Indeed, the expanding human rights mandate of the ECOWAS 
Court has provided a welcome mechanism through which the 
restrictive locus standi requirement of the demonstration of personal 
interest can be skirted. The expanded human rights mandate of the 
ECOWAS Court has been matched by an increase in public interest 
applications, particularly by non-State entities. Illustrative in this 
regard is the SERAP case which was brought by a legal person, a 
human rights NGO, against the government of Nigeria for human 
rights violations, namely failure to ensure the right to education 
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through Nigeria’s ineffective implementation of the Basic Education 
Act and the Children’s Rights Act.169 It is especially significant to 
note that in response to the Nigerian government’s assertion that the 
ECOWAS Court lacked jurisdiction in respect to alleged human 
rights violations, the Court reaffirmed its jurisdiction in this regard 
with express reference to Article 4(g) of the ECOWAS Treaty, Article 
9(4) of its Protocol, and Article 17 of the African Charter.170 
Instructive also, is the Chief Ebrima Manneh case in which the 
applicant brought the reference through authorized representation on 
behalf of a detained Gambian journalist.171 
With regard to access to the SADC Tribunal, references may 
similarly be presented by individuals and non-State entities on behalf 
of putative victims of an alleged contravention of the Treaty. This 
may arise by way of the victim’s express authorization and also in the 
event of the victim’s incapacity to personally file a reference.172 
Moreover, the procedural provision of the SADC Protocol is 
indicative of the Tribunal’s liberal approach to access since it 
additionally entitles legal or natural persons to bring references as an 
agent.173 However, the Tribunal’s decision in the Chirinda case did 
not faithfully reflect this liberal approach. In its response to an 
individual’s application seeking to intervene as a third party in the 
case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd, the Tribunal disallowed the 
application on the basis of, inter alia, the applicants’ failure to 
demonstrate they were vested with “an interest of a legal nature” in 
the initial reference.174 Nonetheless, subsequent decisions of the 
SADC Tribunal are indicative of an increasing inclination towards a 
generous grant of locus standi, which more accurately represents the 
liberal approach to the access of private applicants contemplated in 
the SADC Treaty regime.175 
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Discernible from the above discussion is the fact that access to sub-
regional economic integration bodies is determined, to a large extent, 
by the nature of the legal interest of which the applicant is possessed. 
While the locus standi requirements under the EAC and COMESA 
Treaties are permissive since they obviate the need for demonstrating 
a direct personal interest, hence making provision for wider access by 
individuals and non-State entities, the opposite is the case under the 
treaty regimes of the SADC and ECOWAS. However, as has been 
shown above, the progressive jurisdictional developments of sub-
regional trade judiciaries on the front of human rights may alleviate 
this access limitation. 
C.  Extended Avenues for Access: Amici Participation and Third-
Party Intervention 
Other important avenues through which individual and non-State 
entity applicants may access economic integration judicial bodies and 
thereby take an active part in litigating the alleged violation of rights 
or contraventions of sub-regional trade treaty laws are through amici 
participation and third-party intervention. In the following sections, 
these extended avenues for access to sub-regional trade judiciaries are 
examined. 
1.  Access by way of Amici Participation 
Amici participation usually entails the active involvement of public 
interest groups in filing amicus curiae briefs before sub-regional trade 
judiciaries with a view to litigate matters of public interest so as to 
shape and enhance the progressive development of jurisprudence.176 It 
is noteworthy that the access of private applicants, particularly public 
interest groups, to supranational judicial forums through amici 
participation is a well established practice in most regional and 
international judiciaries.177 Yet, generally, the participation and 
influence of public interest groups in Africa’s economic integration 
processes has been minimal.178 
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With regard to references brought before sub-regional trade 
judiciaries in Africa, the East African Law Society has been a notable 
amici participant. The first amici participation by the East African 
Law Society was in the East Africa Law Society case.179 That case 
came in the wake of the issuance by the EAC Court of an interim 
order in the Anyang’ Nyong’o case preventing the appointment of 
Kenyan representatives to the East African Legislative Assembly and 
the subsequent decision of the Court in favor of the locus standi of 
Kenyan citizens seeking to challenge the appointment of these 
representatives.180 These bold and independent decisions by the Court 
elicited strong criticism from the EAC Council which responded by 
making adverse recommendations to the EAC Summit for an 
amendment leading to the limitation of the Court’s power.181 
Consequently, in the East Africa Law Society case, proceeding 
under Article 30 of the EAC Treaty, the East African Law Society 
challenged the procedural legality of the Treaty amendment under 
Article 150.182 An important point which arose concerned whether 
there is room for judicial control of decisions made by political 
organs of the EAC. One of the respondents, the Attorney General of 
Kenya, contended that since the contested amendments to the EAC 
Treaty were decisions of the EAC Summit, they were not subject to 
judicial review under Article 30.183 It is noteworthy that the above 
argument comes across as being valid, even persuasive, since Article 
30 of the EAC Treaty does not make any express provision for the 
possibility of challenging the legality of an action of an organ of the 
Community; in this case the EAC Summit. Yet, in a flash of judicial 
innovation, the EAC Court took a broad and purposive approach to 
interpreting the EAC Treaty in this regard. It ruled that, in spite of the 
silence of Article 30 in respect to the organs of the Community, a 
restrictive interpretation which would exclude the applicability of this 
Article in instances where an organ of the EAC is alleged to have 
violated the Treaty would be self-defeatist.184 The Court stated: 
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The alleged infringement is the totality of the process of the Treaty 
amendment, which amendment was, and can only be made by the 
parties to the Treaty, namely the Partner States, acting together 
through the organs of the Community. It follows that if in the 
amendment process the Treaty was infringed, it was infringed by 
the Partner States. The reference therefore cannot be barred on the 
ground that its subject matter are decisions and actions of organs of 
the Community.185 
The significance of this decision in the context of the broader 
process of economic integration under the EAC Treaty regime cannot 
be underestimated. This decision bears considerable implications for 
the development of principles which will act as precepts for shaping 
the EAC Court’s future jurisprudence on, inter alia, its jurisdictional 
competence with regard to judicial review of executive action. 
Moreover, especially important to the expanding role of individuals 
and non-State entities in the process of sub-regional economic 
integration is the fact that the Court ruled against the procedural 
propriety of the Treaty amendments made by the Summit. It held, 
additionally, that the amendment contravened the provisions of 
Articles 5(3)(g), 7(1)(a), and 150 of the EAC Treaty primarily 
because the action of the EAC Summit excluded the participation of 
individuals and non-State entities.186 In this regard, the Court clarified 
the Community law regarding the criticality of the role of individuals 
and non-State entities in the broader process of sub-regional 
economic integration. There is a strong likelihood that the above 
decision will have an abiding effect in shaping not only the 
burgeoning jurisprudence of the EAC Treaty regime, but also the 
broader process of sub-regional economic integration. This contention 
finds support in the Courts decision in the East Africa Law Society 
case where it was held that “after this clarification of the law on the 
matter, the infringement is not likely to recur.”187 
The East African Law Society also appeared under an amicus 
curiae application in the Calist Mwatela case before the EAC Court. 
While delivering its decision on the matter, the Court made special 
mention of the contribution of the East African Law Society for its 
“very useful and helpful submissions” with which the Court was 
“guided accordingly.”188 The conduct of the East African Law Society 
in the Calist Mwatela case was commendable as the Society lived up 
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to its duly acknowledged role as a friend of the Court by objectively 
and conscientiously providing the Court with the much needed 
assistance “without any attempt to side with any other party in the 
reference.”189 
2.  Access through Third-Party Intervention 
Access by way of third party intervention is a mechanism through 
which interested persons who are non-parties to a legal dispute may 
seek leave from a judicial body to take part in the proceedings.190 
Most sub-regional economic integration treaties in Africa make 
provision for third-party interventions as an avenue through which 
interested individuals and non-State entities may access their 
respective judicial bodies.191 Moreover, the enabling procedural 
provisions which have been adopted under these respective sub-
regional economic integration judiciaries affirm the right of third-
party intervention by interested private applicants.192 It is noteworthy 
that the third-party intervention regime bears remarkable similarity to 
the class action regime under municipal law; the common rationale of 
both regimes is to foster the consolidation of applications with similar 
facts and whose applicants bear similar legal interests with a view to 
exclude the redundancy and duplicity of effort which would otherwise 
occur.193 
With regard to the practice of third party interventions as a basis 
for access to sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa, the relatively 
recent nature of these judicial bodies and their limited jurisprudence 
dictates that only few instances can be identified. The few notable 
instances that are identifiable have been addressed by, inter alia, the 
SADC Tribunal and the EAC Court. One such instance is the 
Christopher Mtikila case where the third-party intervention was 
sought in respect to a reference seeking to challenge the election of 
two Tanzanian representatives in the East African Legislative 
Assembly.194 In the Anyang Nyong’o case, third parties were similarly 
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allowed to intervene in a reference challenging the election of nine 
Kenyan representatives in the East African Legislative Assembly.195 
On the part of the SADC Tribunal, a third-party intervention came 
about in the Chirinda case where leave was sought to intervene in the 
ongoing Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case. However, in the Chirinda 
case, the Tribunal disallowed the third-party intervention by ruling 
that the applicant had not demonstrated an ‘interest of a legal nature’ 
as is expressly required under Article 70(2)(d).196 An additional 
procedural flaw with the third-party intervention application being 
sought in the Chirinda case, as was observed by the Tribunal, was 
that it was filed as a separate cause rather than the correct approach 
which would have been filing it prior to the hearing of the original 
reference.197 
Notwithstanding the initial failure of the Chirinda case, subsequent 
third-party intervention applications before the SADC Tribunal 
registered a far more encouraging success rate. These include the 
applications of Gideon Stephanus Theron,198 Andrew Paul Rosslyn 
Stidolph,199 and Anglesea Farm (Pvt Ltd),200 all of which sought leave 
to intervene in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case and which were 
additionally filed in remarkably quick succession. The applicants 
were not only given leave to intervene, but were also granted 
injunctive reliefs similar to those given in respect of the original 
reference.201 The allowance of these third-party interventions by the 
SADC Tribunal is reflective of the practice of the African 
Commission where communications dealing with similar fact 
situations can be consolidated.202 
D.  Primacy of Sub-regional Trade Judicial Decisions vis-à-vis the 
Sovereignty Question 
The formation of supranational organizations, including sub-
regional trade blocs, presides over the invariable concession of some 
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sovereignty by individual member States to these organizations. 
Consequently, the enforcement of sub-regional economic integration 
treaties, likewise with many other international treaties, entails a 
delicate balancing act between the sovereign prerogatives of member 
States and the primacy of Community or Common Market law. In the 
Anyang’ Nyong’o case, the EAC Court described this challenge as 
involving the “balancing [of] individual state sovereignty with 
integration” imperatives.203 Executing this balance presents a daunting 
yet surmountable obstacle which—as an essential precondition for 
long-term success—all economic integration processes must hurdle 
over. Thus, striking the right balance on this score is crucial to the 
entire enterprise of economic integration.204 
Judicial bodies of sub-regional treaty provenance are amongst the 
key institutions through which sub-regional trade law is enforced, and 
also where the tussle for power between States and organs of the 
respective economic integration body is most keenly felt. Indeed, the 
execution by sub-regional trade judiciaries of their mandates has often 
been met by the affected States’ unwillingness to surrender their 
sovereignty to a supranational judicial body, particularly once the 
practical implications of what they agreed to become apparent. This 
reluctance is informed by the fact that by exercising their jurisdiction, 
sub-regional trade judiciaries may generate legal norms capable of 
altering the position of States.205 Sub-regional trade judiciaries are 
thus faced with the challenge of mediating the relationships among 
the organs of the economic integration bodies and the member 
States.206 In this regard, in rendering its decision in the Anyang’ 
Nyong’o case, the EAC Court observed that “[W]hile the Treaty 
upholds the principle of sovereign equality . . . by the very nature of 
the objectives they set out to achieve, each partner State is expected to 
cede some amount of sovereignty to the Community and its organs 
albeit in limited areas to enable them play their role.”207 
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The emerging jurisprudence of economic integration in Africa 
strongly indicates that the sub-regional trade judiciaries have been 
trying to strike the right balance between the various competing 
interests. A clear indication of this is found in the Calist Mwatela case 
where the EAC Court stated that: “[T]he competence of the 
Community is restricted to matters which are within its jurisdiction. 
Any matter which is still under the exclusive authority of the Partner 
States is beyond the legislative competence of the Community”.208 
Hence, it is fair to observe that the legitimacy of sub-regional trade 
judiciaries and the effectiveness of their redress mechanisms are key 
components for the sustainability of economic integration in Africa.209 
The EAC Treaty makes express provision for the priority of 
Community law over domestic law.210 On the other hand, the SADC 
Treaty regime contains no provision on the relationship between 
Community law and domestic law.211 Nevertheless, in the absence of 
express provision resort may be had to Article 21 of the SADC 
Treaty.212 Moreover, Article 16(5) of the SADC Treaty and Article 
24(3) of the SADC Protocol enshrine the finality clauses, according to 
which the Tribunal’s decisions and rulings are final and binding.213 
The greatest challenge yet, not only to the primacy of sub-regional 
trade judiciaries over national judicial decisions, but also to the very 
legitimacy of sub-regional economic integration judicial bodies, has 
come in the wake of decisions against States. Subsequent to the EAC 
Court’s decision in the Anyang’ Nyongo case, in which an injunction 
was issued against the election of some Kenyan members to the East 
Africa Law Assembly, the Partner States of the EAC amended 
Articles 27 and 30 of the EAC Treaty, severely limiting the 
jurisdiction of the Court.214 A similar case is that of the SADC 
Tribunal in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd case, where in a brazen show 
of disregard for the SADC Tribunal’s decision and in one of the most 
intriguing, if unfortunate, exhibition of political posturing under the 
guise of national sovereignty, the government of Zimbabwe 
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vigorously refused to comply with the decision of the Tribunal.215 The 
respondent government argued, inter alia, that it had not ratified the 
SADC Protocol and therefore was not bound by the Tribunal’s 
decision.216 Another similar instance arose when Gambia declined to 
comply with the decision of the ECOWAS Court in the Ebrima 
Manneh case in respect of the unlawful detention of a journalist.217 
The above discussion reveals the institutional oversight in the 
architectural design of sub-regional economic structures in Africa 
which may contribute towards significantly undermining their 
effectiveness in the longer term. An examination of the constitutive 
economic integration treaties in Africa shows that the structures of 
their respective economic integration organizations are reflective of 
an entrenched State-centricity. This is clearly brought out by the 
manner in which the drafting of the treaties allows States to retain a 
firm foothold on the making of determinative decisions which shape 
the administration of the economic integration process. In this regard, 
the priority of States over other entities is almost certainly assured. 
IV 
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE APPLICANTS IN ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION REGIMES: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
A crucial feature in every legal system, including those of sub-
regional trade, is the presence of mechanisms through which the 
substantive as well as procedural legality of measures adopted by its 
institutions may be tested.218 Through such mechanisms, individuals 
and non-State entities may move to challenge actions or omissions of 
States which contravene the relevant sub-regional law. The above 
discussion has highlighted the emerging role of private applicants in 
shaping the burgeoning jurisprudence of sub-regional trade 
judiciaries. However, not all indications are suggestive of States’ 
support for this development. Quite to the contrary, States have in 
some instances resorted to curtailing the power of sub-regional trade 
judiciaries in the wake of decisions rendered by these judicial bodies 
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against their favor. Particularly illustrative in this respect is the case 
of the EAC Treaty, which was amended by Member State 
governments in disapproval of the EAC Court’s decision in the 
Anyang’ Nyong’o case, and subsequently limited, inter alia, access to 
the Court.219 Moreover, even where the locus standi of non-State 
applicants has been acknowledged, the possibility of a further grant in 
this regard appears very slim. Hence, States’ recalcitrance in the face 
of sub-regional trade judicial decisions remains a formidable 
challenge to the wider participation by individuals and non-State 
entities in the broader process of regional integration. 
Nonetheless, the increased grant of locus standi to private 
applicants and the subsequent broadening of their access to sub-
regional judicial bodies, especially under the umbrella of effective 
protection of human rights, holds considerable promise for the 
prospect of the continued prominence of individuals and non-State 
entities in the broader process of economic integration. The 
jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court illustrates this point particularly 
well.220 The centrality of private applicants in this regard, 
significantly empowers the “people” by raising the platform for their 
mainstream popular participation in economic integration, including 
the private enforcement of the rule of law.221 Importantly also, it 
ushers in the era of anthropocentric (people-centered) approaches, as 
opposed to State-centric approaches, to the broader process of 
economic integration.222 Moreover, featuring as a positive implication 
of the increased role of private applicants in sub-regional litigation is 
their innovative possibility to circumvent States’ aversion to 
instituting claims amongst themselves as well as the disinclination of 
sub-regional trade institutions and organs to institute references 
against States. Hence, it is fair to observe that although there are some 
challenges, it appears—and is certainly desirable—that individuals 
and non-State entities stand to play a continuing vital role in the 
broader process of economic integration in Africa. 
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CONCLUSION 
The principal concern of this Article has been to analyze the access 
and locus standi of private applicants, specifically individuals and 
non-State entities, before sub-regional trade judiciaries in Africa. Its 
discussion of the nascent decisions of these sub-regional trade judicial 
bodies indicates that the respective judiciaries have started exercising 
jurisdiction over trade disputes as well as human rights issues. The 
sub-regional trade judicial bodies which formed the basis of this 
examination included, inter alia, the EAC Court, the SADC Tribunal, 
the COMESA Court and the ECOWAS Court. As has been shown, in 
marked departure from the hitherto state of under-utilization, sub-
regional trade judiciaries have gradually and steadily begun to evince 
the increasing participation of private applicants in litigation. The 
case of the ECOWAS Court whose jurisdiction was extended in 2005 
to cover human rights complaints as a result of references brought 
before it by individuals illustrates this point well.223 The result of the 
increased participation of individuals and non-State entities in 
litigation before these judicial bodies has been the emergence of a 
burgeoning amount of sub-regional jurisprudence which was hitherto 
inexistent. This is an encouraging development. 
However, it is important to note that these progressive steps 
towards the development of a robust and organic sub-regional 
jurisprudence in Africa have not been unattended with difficulty. On 
the contrary, State parties have at times been non-committal, and in 
some notable cases even duplicitous, in their support for the 
increasing access and locus standi of individuals and non-State actors 
to sub-regional trade judiciaries.224 The ECOWAS and EAC Treaty 
regimes are notable examples of member States’ dogged attempts at, 
and in some cases success in, curtailing the access of private 
applicants to the respective judicial bodies. Moreover, most sub-
regional trade judicial bodies in Africa have been operating under 
increasingly straitened circumstances owing to the failure by member 
States to honor their funding commitments. Nonetheless, it is 
encouraging to note that the exponential development of 
jurisprudence has not been completely hobbled by these challenges. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that remarkably bold rulings have been 
issued by the SADC Tribunal and the EAC Court despite the fact that 
they were likely to ruffle the feathers of the concerned member States. 
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This is strongly indicative of the clarity of these judicial bodies’ 
principled resolve, their steadfast independence and tenacious 
resilience even in the face of near-certain potential backlash from the 
chagrined member States. 
This Article’s discussion of the access and locus standi of private 
applicants, and the critical role that they play in the broader process of 
sub-regional economic integration makes it apparent that individuals 
and non-State entities figure prominently not only in the judicial 
process, but also in the wider economic integration process in the 
African continent. Additionally, it is arguable that all indications 
point to the continuing prominence of the role of private applicants in 
the sub-regional economic integration regimes in Africa. Also 
discernible is the fact that there remain far more unexplored avenues 
through which individuals and non-State entities may seek the 
remedies available under the respective sub-regional trade regimes. 
Hence, the most appropriate course of action for individuals and non-
State entities would be for them to seek innovative methods to exploit 
these remedies and other available opportunities under the sub-
regional economic integration treaty regimes. This will engender the 
twin benefits of ensuring the effective remedy for infractions of sub-
regional law as well as the progressive development of jurisprudence 
to which other bodies may return to with considerable profit. 
 
 
